In this paper, we study the uniform definability problem of connectives in propositional dependence logic (PD). Every formula with intuitionistic disjunction or intuitionistic implication can be translated equivalently into a formula of PD without these two connectives. We show that although such a (non-uniform) translation exists, neither intuitionistic disjunction nor intuitionistic implication is uniformly definable in PD.
Introduction
In this paper, we study the uniform definability problem of connectives in propositional dependence logic. Dependence logic is a new logical formalism that characterizes the notion of "dependence" in social and natural sciences. First-order dependence logic was introduced by Väänänen (2007) as a development of Henkin quantifier (Henkin, 1961) and independence-friendly logic (Hintikka & Sandu (1989 ), (1996 ). Recently, propositional dependence logic was studied and axiomatized in (Yang, 2014) , (Yang & Väänänen, 2014) , (Sano & Virtema, to appear) . With a different motivation, Ciardelli & Roelofsen (2011) introduced and axiomatized inquisitive logic, which is essentially equivalent to propositional intuitionistic dependence logic, an important variant of propositional dependence logic considered in this paper.
Dependency relations are characterized in propositional dependence logic (PD) by a new type of atoms =( p, q), called dependence atoms. Intuitively, the atom specifies that the proposition q depends completely on the propositions p, or the truth value of q is determined by those of p. For example, the following sentences from natural language and mathematics can be expressed by dependence atoms =(YChro, Male) and =(x > 0, y > 0, f > 0), respectively: 
(a) "Whether the baby is male or not depends completely on whether a 'Y' chromosome has passed to it from the father or not."
(b) "For the real function f (x, y) = xy, whether f (x, y) > 0 depends completely on the signs of x and y."
The semantics of PD is called team semantics, which was originally introduced by Hodges (1997a Hodges ( ), (1997b as a compositional semantics for independence-friendly logic. The basic idea is that sentences describing "dependence" (such as sentences (a) and (b) above) cannot be meaningfully evaluated on single valuations, as in the usual propositional logic. Instead, formulas of PD are said to be true or false with respect to sets of valuations, called teams. Teams can be understood as representations of (relational) databases (such as the ones illustrated in Tables 1 and 2) , from which dependencies between attributes can be identified. On a team X (i.e., a set of valuations), the formula =( p, q) is true if the values of q is functionally determined by the values of p, or more formally, if s( p) = s ′ ( p) implies s(q) = s ′ (q) for all valuations s, s ′ ∈ X. Propositional dependence logic has the downwards closed property, and it was proved in (Yang & Väänänen, 2014 ) (see also (Yang, 2014) ) that in terms of expressive power, PD is a maximal downwards closed logic. As a consequence, adding other connectives of team semantics that preserve the downwards closure property will not increase the expressive power of the logic. Connectives of this kind include intuitionistic disjunction and intuitionistic implication, which were introduced in (Abramsky & Väänänen, 2009) , and studied in (Yang, 2013) , (Yang & Väänänen, 2014) and also in (Ciardelli & Roelofsen, 2011) , (Ciardelli, 2009 ). In particular, every propositional formula with intuitionistic disjunction or intuitionistic implication can be translated equivalently into a formula of PD without these two connectives. In this paper, we show that although such a (non-uniform) translation exists, neither of intuitionistic disjunction and intuitionistic implication is uniformly definable in PD.
This work is inspired by (Galliani, 2013) , in which the weak universal quantifier ∀ 1 of team semantics is shown to be non-uniformly definable in first-order dependence logic, even though every instance of ∀ 1 is definable in the logic. Similar results are also found in (Ciardelli, 2009) , where it is (essentially) proved that in propositional intuitionistic dependence logic, every instance of conjunction is expressible in terms of other connectives of the logic, but the logic does not have a uniform definition for conjunction.
In most familiar single-valuation based logics, such as classical propositional logic and intuitionistic propositional logic, a connective being definable is one and the same thing as it being uniformly definable. However, the situation in logics based on team semantics is different, as the result of this paper and those mentioned in the foregoing paragraph show. To the knowledge of the author, this phenomenon is new. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we introduce propositional dependence logic and its variants. In Section 2, we give formal definition of uniform definability of connectives, and make some remarks concerning definability and uniform definability in classical and intuitionistic propositional logic. In Section 3, we study the properties of contexts for PD, which is a crucial notion for this paper. Section 4 presents the main results: neither intuitionistic implication nor intuitionistic disjunction is uniformly definable in PD.
Propositional dependence logic and its variants
In this section, we introduce propositional dependence logic (PD) and propositional intuitionistic dependence logic (PID), and recall some basic properties of the logics. Roughly speaking, PD is classical propositional logic with dependence atoms, while PID is intuitionistic propositional logic with dependence atoms. Below we present the syntax of the logics. Definition 2.1. Let p i , p i 1 , . . . , p i k be propositional variables.
• Well-formed formulas of propositional dependence logic are given by the following grammar
where k ≥ 1.
• Well-formed formulas of propositional intuitionistic dependence logic are given by the following grammar
The connective ⊗ is called tensor (disjunction), as it corresponds to additive conjunction (instead of disjunction!) of linear logic, interested readers are referred to (Abramsky & Väänänen, 2009 ) for further discussions. As it will become clear in the semantics to be given, one should also view ⊗ as the connective lifted from the disjunction of classical propositional logic. The connectives ∨ and → are called intuitionistic disjunction and intuitionistic implication, respectively, and they are introduced in (Abramsky & Väänänen, 2009) . Note that all PD-formulas are in negation normal form, that is, negation is only allowed to occur in front of propositional variables. For the logic PD, we abbreviate p i ⊗ ¬p i as ⊤, and p i ∧ ¬p i as ⊥. For the logic PID, we abbreviate φ → ⊥ as ¬φ. With the semantics to be given, the negated propositional variable ¬p i has the same meaning as p i → ⊥.
The formula =(p i 1 , . . . , p i k ) is called a dependence atom, and it shall be read as "p i k depends on p i 1 , . . . , p i k−1 ". The formula =(p i ) is a special case of a dependence atom and it is called a constancy dependence atom, read as "(the value of) p i is constant". The truth of a dependence atom can not be manifested in a single valuation, instead, to evaluate a dependence atom, a set of valuations should be considered. These sets are called teams, and such a semantics is called team semantics, which was originally introduced by Hodges (1997a Hodges ( ), (1997b as a compositional semantics for independence-friendly logic (Hintikka & Sandu (1989 ), (1996 ). We now define team semantics formally.
Definition 2.2. (i)
A valuation is a function s : N → {0, 1}. 1 A team is a set of valuations. Table 3 illustrates an example of a team. In particular, the empty set / 0 is a team.
(ii) For any n ∈ N, an n-valuation s 0 on N is the restriction of a valuation s to an n-element subset N of N, that is, s 0 = s ↾ N . An n-team on N is a set of n-valuations on N . Table 4 illustrates an example of a 4-team on {1, 2, 5, 8}.
(iii) We write φ(p i 1 , . . . , p i n ) to mean that the propositional variables occurring in the formula φ are among p i 1 , . . . , p i n , and such a formula is called an n-formula.
Fix an n-element set N of natural numbers, there are in total 2 n distinct nvaluations, and 2 2 n distinct n-valuations, among which there exists a maximal team consisting of all of the n-valuations on N , denoted by 2 n .
1 N denotes the set of all natural numbers. Natural numbers are defined inductively as: 0 := / 0; n + 1 := n ∪ {n}. 
• X |= ¬p i iff for all s ∈ X, s(i) = 0;
• X |= ⊥ iff X = / 0;
• X |= φ ∧ ψ iff X |= φ and X |= ψ;
Let L be the logic PD or PID. For any formula φ of L, if X |= φ holds for all teams X, then we say that φ is valid in the logic, denoted by |= L φ or simply |= φ.
The team semantics for n-formulas of PID (without dependence atoms) corresponds to the usual intutionistic Kripke semantics over the fixed Kripke frame (P(2 n ) \ { / 0}, ⊇) (a Medvedev frame) with negative valuations. Moreover, PID is essentially equivalent to inquisitive logic, introduced in (Ciardelli & Roelofsen, 2011 ) with a completely different motivation. Interested readers are referred to (Yang, 2014) , (Yang & Väänänen, 2014) , (Ciardelli, 2009 ) for further discussions.
In this paper, we will also consider the logic of PD extended with intuitionistic disjunction, denoted by PD ∨ , studied in (Yang, 2014) , (Yang & Väänänen, 2014) . We call the logics PD, PID, PD ∨ and their variants logics based on team semantics. Next, we recall basic properties of these logics. 
Lemma 2.4 (Locality
Let N = {i 1 , . . . , i n } and L a logic based on team semantics. For each Lformula φ(p i 1 , . . . , p i n ), we write φ N for the set of all n-teams on N satisfying φ, i.e.,
where 2 n is the maximal n-team on N , and write ∇ N for the family of all nonempty downwards closed collections of n-teams on N , i.e.,
Clearly, φ N ∈ ∇ N for formulas φ(p i 1 , . . . , p i n ) of the logics PD, PID and PD ∨ . We call L a maximal downwards closed logic if
Theorem 2.7 (Ciardelli, Huuskonen, Yang) . PID, PD and PD ∨ are maximal downwards closed logics.
Proof (sketch) . See (Yang, 2014) , (Yang & Väänänen, 2014) . Let N = {i 1 , . . . , i n }, and K = {X j | j ∈ J} ∈ ∇ N . The set K is definable in PID by the formula
that is, K = Ψ . In PD ∨ , K is definable by the formula j∈J Θ X j , where
In PD, the formula that defines
, where
is defined inductively as follows:
Note that the formula Θ ⋆ X has the property that
We end this section with some comments on substitutions of PD and PID. First, note that by the definition of the syntax of PD (Definition 2.1), strings of the form ¬φ or =(φ 1 , . . . , φ k ) are not always well-formed formulas of PD. As a consequence, uniform substitution is not well-defined for PD, since the substitution instances of ¬p i or =(p i 1 , . . . , p i k ) are not always well-formed formulas of PD. This problem should not be viewed as an essential flaw, as it can be solved by expanding the language of PD, and by Theorem 2.7, doing so will not change the expressive power of the logic. As in the literature of dependence logic (e.g. (Väänänen, 2007) ), we may view the string ¬φ as the formula obtained by pushing negation all the way to the front of atoms of φ and define X |= ¬ =(p i 1 , . . . , p i k ) iff X = / 0 (see e.g. (Väänänen, 2007) for discussions on this definition). On the other hand, the semantics for =(φ 1 , . . . , φ k , ψ) is unclear in the field, especially, the intuitive meaning of e.g., the formula =(=(p i ), =(p j )) is unclear. Finding reasonable interpretations for all substitution instances of PD formulas is beyond the scope of this paper, so we will stick to the syntax given in Definition 2.1, and avoid the substitution problem for PD in a certain way (to be clarified in the next section). Besides the above-mentioned issue concerning definitions, the logic PD is not closed under uniform substitutions, because, for example, |= p i ⊗ ¬p i , whereas |==(p i ) ⊗ ¬ =(p i ). The same phenomenon can be found in the logic PID as well, as e.g., |= ¬¬p i → p i , whereas |= ¬¬(p i ∨ ¬p i ) → (p i ∨ ¬p i ). Note that uniform substation is well-defined in PID, so the failure of closure under uniform substitutions of logics based on team semantics is not a result of the non-well-definedness of uniform substitution, but rather a feature of team semantics. It is worth mentioning that Ciardelli (2009) proved (in the context of inquisitive logic, but essentially also for PID) that PID is, however, closed under negative substitutions, i.e., substitutions σ such that |= σ(p i ) ↔ ¬¬σ(p i ) for all propositional variables p i .
Contexts and Uniform Definability of Connectives
In this section, we define context and uniform definability of connectives for PD, PID, as well as classical propositional logic (CPL) and intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL). We also make some remarks concerning definability and uniformly definability of connectives in CPL and IPL. Let us start by re-examining the syntax and semantics of the logics.
where Atom L is a set of atoms, and Conn L is a set of connectives (each with an arity). The set WFF L of (well-formed) formulas of L is defined inductively as follows:
The set of atoms of CPL or IPL consists of all propositional variables. The set Conn CPL of connectives of CPL contains classical negation ¬ and all other classical connectives, and the set Conn IPL = {⊥, ∧, ∨, →} (recall that intuitionistic negation is defined as: ¬φ := φ → ⊥). To avoid the substitution problem mentioned in the previous section, in this paper, special attention needs to be paid to the syntax of PD and PID. We stipulate that the language of PD is the pair (Atom PD , Conn PD ), where
and Conn PD = {∧, ⊗}. Both negated propositional variables ¬p i and the dependence atoms =(p i 1 , . . . , p i k ) are considered as atoms that cannot be decomposed. Similarly, the language of PID is the pair (Atom PID , Conn PID ), where
Definition 3.2 (semantics of a propositional logic).
To a propositional logic L, we assign a class (or a set) ∇ L (or simply written as ∇) as its semantics space. Every atom α ∈ Atom L of a logic L is associated with a set α ∈ ∇, and every γ-ary connective ∈ Conn L is associated with an interpretation function :
In case the logic L is clear from the context, we write simply φ for the class φ L .
The interpretation φ CPL of a CPL-formula φ is the set of all valuations that makes φ true, namely
For an IPL-formula φ, φ IPL is the class of all point-Kripke models that satisfies φ, namely
is an intuitionistic Kripke model with a node w and M, w |= φ}.
For a propositional logic L based on team semantics, such as PD and PID, the set φ L consists of all teams satisfying φ, namely
Note that · N and ∇ N defined by equations (1) and (2) in the previous section can be viewed as a restricted version of · and ∇ here in this context. Let L 1 , L 2 be propositional logics with the languages
and well-formed formulas of both logics have the same interpretations in both log-
If φ |= ψ and ψ |= φ, then we write φ ≡ L ψ or simply φ ≡ ψ and say that φ and ψ are semantically equivalent. Recall that the fragment [¬, ∨] CPL of CPL which only has classical negation and disjunction as connectives has the same expressive power as full CPL which contains all classical connectives, because the set {¬, ∨} of classical connectives is functionally complete, meaning that each possible classical connective is uniformly definable in terms of ¬ and ∨. For example, for every formulas θ 1 and θ 2 , their conjunction is defined as θ 1 ∧ θ 2 ≡ ¬(¬θ 1 ∨ ¬θ 2 ). Other known functionally complete sets of connectives of CPL are {¬, ∧}, {¬, →}, {| (Sheffer stroke)}, etc, therefore the fragments of CPL formed by these sets of connectives all have the same expressive power as full CPL. On the other hand, for the logic IPL, for example, the ∨ and ⊥-free fragment [∧, →] IPL does not have the same expressive power as full IPL, because full IPL has infinitely many non-equivalent formulas, whereas by Diego's Theorem, there are only finitely many [∧, →] IPL -formulas (see e.g. (Chagrov & Zakharyaschev, 1997) ). In fact, none of the fragments of IPL formed by fewer connectives has the same expressive power as full IPL, as it is well-known that the intuitionistic connectives ⊥, ∧, ∨ and → are independent of each other, meaning that none of them is definable in terms of the other connectives.
Concerning the expressive power of logics based on team semantics, Theorem 2.7 implies the following corollary, where (and hereafter) we may take PD [⊥,∨,→] as the underlying full logic.
Obviously, if two logics L 1 and L 2 have the same expressive power, then for every
, and in this case the definition θ 1 ∧ θ 2 ≡ ¬(¬θ 1 ∨ ¬θ 2 ) discussed above actually works uniformly for all instances of ∧. On the other hand, for the logics based on team semantics, even if Corollary 3.4 implies that every instance of intuitionistic disjunction and every instance of intuitionistic implication are definable in PD, it does not follow that these connectives have uniform definitions in PD. The main result of this paper is that neither intuitionistic disjunction nor intuitionistic implication is uniformly definable in PD.
To proceed with the argument of this paper, let us define the notion of uniform definability of connectives formally. Basically, a connective is uniformly definable in a propositional logic L if there is a context for L which defines the connective. Intuitively, a context for L is an L-formula with "holes" that are to be filled with concrete instances of formulas. This definition is inspired by that of the same notion in the first-order setting given by Galliani in (Galliani, 2013) .
Definition 3.5 (context).
A context for a propositional logic L is an L-formula with distinguished atoms r i (i ∈ N). We write φ[r 1 , . . . , r γ ] to mean that the distinguished atoms occurring in the context φ are among r 1 , . . . , r γ .
The distinguished atoms r i in the above definition should be understood as "place holders" or "holes", which mark the places that are to be substituted uniformly by concrete instances of formulas. For the logics CPL, IPL, PD, PD ∨ or PID, each r i is a distinguished propositional variable, and a context for these logics is a formula built from propositional variables r i (i ∈ N) and other atoms using the connectives of the logic. For example, the formula
is a context for CPL, and the formula On the other hand, none of the connectives of IPL is uniformly definable in the fragment of IPL without the connective.
With our notion of uniform definability of connectives, one can define formally the notion of compositional translation (or algebraic translation) between logics, discussed in e.g., (Janssen, 1998) .
(ii) for each γ-ary connective of L 1 , there is a context φ [r 1 , . . . , r γ ] for L 2 which uniformly defines and
holds for any L 1 -formulas θ 1 , . . . , θ γ .
We proceed the proof by induction on ψ. If ψ ∈ Atom L 1 , then the required equation follows from condition (i) of Definition 3.7. If ψ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ), where θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ∈ WFF L 1 , then
However, the converse direction of Lemma 3.8, i.e.,
is not true in general. The next theorem (essentially due to (Ciardelli, 2009) ) is an example of the failure of ( * ) in the team semantics setting. We include its proof sketch here. Proof (sketch) . By the proof of Theorem 2.7, every PID-formula φ(p i 1 , . . . , i n ) is equivalent to a formula Ψ as in Equation (3), where each disjunct
is flat 3 and can thus be viewed as a formula of classical propositional logic. The set {⊥, ∨, →} of connectives is functionally complete for CPL, thus Ψ i is equivalent in CPL to a formula Ψ ′ i with connectives only from the set {⊥, ∨, →}. Because of the flatness, Ψ i and Ψ ′ i are equivalent in PID as well. Therefore φ is equivalent in PID to the conjunction-free formula j∈J Ψ ′ j . This shows that
Proposition 3.5.5 in (Ciardelli, 2009 ) proves that conjunction is not uniformly definable in the conjunction-free fragment of inquisitive logic, which is [⊥, ∨, → ] PID without dependence atoms. Noting that =(p i ) ≡ p i ∨ ¬p i , i.e., dependence atoms are definable in the presence of the connectives ⊥, ∨ and →, we conclude that conjunction is not uniformly definable in [⊥, ∨, →] PID . This shows that PID ≤ c [⊥, ∨, →] PID .
In this paper, we will prove that PID, PD ∨ ≤ c PD and PID ≤ c PD ∨ , even though PID ≡ PD ∨ ≡ PD. This is another example of the failure of ( * ). Nevertheless, ( * ) does hold for most familiar logics, e.g., CPL and IPL. In fact, for any sublogic L 0 of L ∈ {CPL, IPL}, if every instance of a connective is definable in L 0 , then is uniformly definable in L 0 . A proof of this fact goes as follows: Say, for example, is a binary connective and r 1 r 2 is equivalent to an L 0 -formula φ(r 1 , r 2 , p). Then ⊢ L (r 1 r 2 ) ↔ φ(r 1 , r 2 , p), which implies
as L is closed under uniform substation. From this we conclude the context φ[r 1 , r 2 ] for L 0 uniformly defines . It is possible to extract from the foregoing argument certain general condition under which ( * ) will hold. However, a propositional logic in general may have unexpected properties that are very different from those of the most familiar logics (for example, it may not be closed under uniform substitution, or even uniform substitution may not be well-defined in the logic, as with PD, PD ∨ ). For this reason, we leave this issue for future research and do not make any claim concerning this in this paper.
Contexts for PD
In this section, we investigate the properties of contexts for propositional dependence logic. These properties are important for the main results of this paper.
In Definition 3.5, we defined contexts for propositional logics in general. In the case of PD, a context is a formula φ with distinguished propositional variables r i (i ∈ N) built from the following grammar:
where p i , p j 1 , . . . , p j k are (non-distinguished) propositional variables. Note that for technical reasons that will become clear in Definition 4.7, we do not omit parentheses in a context. As emphasized in the previous section, we do not view negation as a connective, and dependence atoms cannot be decomposed, therefore a context cannot have a subformula of the form ¬r i or =(p j 1 , . . . , p j m−1 , r i , p j m+1 . . . , p j k ). To make this point clear, below we present the formal definition of subformulas of contexts for PD. Definition 4.1 (Subformula). Let φ be a context for PD. We define the set Sub(φ) of subformulas of φ inductively as follows:
• Sub(r i ) = {r i };
• Sub(p i ) = {p i };
• Sub(¬p i ) = {¬p i };
• Sub(= (p j 1 , . . . , p j k )) = {=(p j 1 , . . . , p j k )}; 
. . , r γ ], which is consistent, then ψ and χ cannot be both inconsistent. There are the following two cases:
Case 1: Only one of ψ and χ is inconsistent. Without loss of generality, we may assume that ψ[r 1 , . . . , r γ ] ≈ ⊥ and χ[r 1 , . . . , r γ ] ≈ χ ′ [r 1 , . . . , r γ ], where χ ′ is a context for PD which does not contain a single inconsistent subformula. Clearly, 
Contexts for PD are monotone in the sense of the following lemma. 
Proof. Suppose θ i |= θ ′ i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ γ and X |= φ[θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ] for some team X. We prove by induction on φ[r 1 , . . . , In the main proofs of this chapter, we will make use of syntax trees of contexts for PD. Now, we recall the definition of labeled full binary tree.
Definition 4.5 (Full Binary Tree). A full binary tree is a triple (T, ≺, r) which satisfies the following conditions:
(i) T is a non-empty set with r ∈ T . Elements of T are called nodes or points. The node r is called the root of T .
(ii) ≺ is a binary relation on T which satisfies the following conditions:
(c) For all t ∈ T \ {r}, r ≺ t.
(d) Each node t ∈ T \ {r} has a unique immediate predecessor t 0 ∈ T . A node t 0 is called an immediate predecessor of a node t if t 0 ≺ t and there is no node t ′ with t 0 ≺ t ′ ≺ t. In this case, the node t 0 is called the parent of t, and t is called a child of t 0 .
(e) Each parent has exactly two children. The nodes of T which have no children are called leaves.
A node t 0 ∈ T is said to be an ancestor of a node t 1 ∈ T if t 0 ≺ t 1 .The depth d(t) of a node t in a full binary tree (T, ≺, r) is defined inductively as follows:
Definition 4.6 (Labeled Full Binary Tree). A labeled full binary tree with root r is a quadruple T = (T, ≺, r, f) such that (T, ≺, r) is a full binary tree with root r and f is a function from T into a non-empty set F . Figure 1: The syntax tree of ((
In order to give a technical definition of syntax tree of context for PD, we will need to fix a specific occurrence of a subformula in a context. To this end, we count the number of parentheses in a context. For example, the context 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
has 8 parentheses (excluding the parentheses of the dependence atom). In the formula depicted above, we labeled each parenthesis by a natural number positioned right below the parenthesis. The parenthesis labeled with the natural number k is the k-th parenthesis of the formula (counting from the left). Let k m φ ψ be a subformula of a context θ, where ∈ {∧, ⊗} and the above two outermost parentheses are the k-th and the m-th parentheses in θ, respectively. The formula φ is said to be bounded by the k-th parenthesis, and every parenthesis in φ is said to be inside the scope of the k-th parenthesis. Similarly, the formula ψ is said to be bounded by the m-th parenthesis, and every parenthesis in ψ is said to be inside the scope of the m-th parenthesis. Our treatment of specific occurrences of subformulas is analogous to that in Section 5.2 of (Väänänen, 2007) , one may compare (6) with Table 5 .1 in (Väänänen, 2007) . Below we present the definition of syntax tree of context for PD. An example of a syntax tree is depicted in Figure 1 . • r = 0; • f is a function f : T → Sub(φ) satisfying f(0) = φ and f(k) = ψ k for k > 0, where ψ k is the subformula of φ bounded by the k-th parenthesis.
If f(k) = ψ, we sometimes say that the node k is labeled with ψ or the formula ψ is attached to the node k. Clearly, the syntax tree of a context is finite, and the leaf nodes are always labeled with atoms.
For a context φ[r 1 , . . . , r γ ] for PD, if X |= φ[θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ], then each occurrence of a subformula of φ[θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ] is satisfied by a subteam of X. This can be described explicitly by a function τ which maps each node in the syntax tree T φ of φ[θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ] to a subteam of X satisfying the formula attached to the node. We now give the definition of such functions. 
A truth function τ is called a truth function for φ[θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ] over an n-team X iff τ (0) = X. 
over an n-team X, then for all nodes k in the syntax tree of φ, τ (k) ⊆ X.
Proof. Easy, by induction on
First-order dependence logic has a game-theoretic semantics with perfect information games played with respect to teams (see Section 5.2 in (Väänänen, 2007) ).
With obvious adaptions, one can define a game-theoretic semantics for propositional dependence logic. 4 A truth function defined in Definition 4.8 corresponds to a winning strategy for the Verifier in the game. An appropriate semantic game for PD has the property that X |= φ if and only if the Verifier has a winning strategy in the corresponding game. The next theorem states essentially the same property for truth functions. C.f. Lemma 5.12, Proposition 5.11 and Theorem 5.8 in (Väänänen, 2007) . Proof. The direction "⇐=" follows easily from the definition. For the other direction "=⇒", suppose X |= φ[θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ]. Let T φ = (T, ≺, r, f) be the syntax tree of φ. We define the value of τ on each node k of T φ and check conditions (i)-(iii) of Definition 4.8 by induction on the depth of the nodes.
If k = 0 the root, then define τ (0) = X. Since X |= φ[θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ], condition (i) is satisfied for the node 0.
Suppose k is not a leaf node, τ (k) has been defined already and conditions (i)-(iii) are satisfied for k. Let k 0 , k 1 be the two children of k with f(k 0 ) = ψ and f(k 1 ) = χ for some subformulas ψ, χ of φ. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1:
Hence τ is a truth function for φ[θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ] over X.
The next lemma shows that a truth function is determined by its values on the leaves of the syntax tree. Proof. It suffices to prove that τ satisfies condition (i) with respect to θ 1 , . . . , θ γ for all nodes of T φ . We show this by induction on the depth of k.
Leaf nodes satisfy condition (i) by the assumption. Now, assume k is not a leaf. Then k has two children k 0 , k 1 with f(k 0 ) = ψ and f(k 1 ) = χ for some subformulas
, by induction hypothesis, we have that
Now, we distinguish two cases.
Case 2:
Non-uniformly definable connectives in PD
In this section, we prove that neither intuitionistic implication nor intuitionistic disjunction is uniformly definable in PD.
By Lemma 4.3, contexts for PD are monotone, thus PD cannot define uniformly non-monotone connectives. Below we show that intuitionistic implication is not uniformly definable in PD as it is not monotone. 5
Theorem 5.1. Intuitionistic implication is not uniformly definable in PD.
Proof. Suppose there was a context φ[r 1 , r 2 ] for PD which defines intuitionistic implication. Then for any PD-formulas ψ and χ,
Clearly X |= ⊥ → ⊥ and X |= ⊤ → ⊥ hold for any non-empty team X. It follows from (8) that X |= φ[⊥, ⊥] and X |= φ[⊤, ⊥]. But this contradicts Lemma 4.3 as ⊥ |= ⊤.
We now proceed to give another sufficient condition for connectives being not uniformly definable in PD. It will follow from this that intuitionistic disjunction is not uniformly definable in PD.
We have that e.g. ⊥ ∨ ⊤ |= ⊥ and ⊤ ∨ ⊥ |= ⊥, from these it follows that in the syntax tree of a context φ[r 1 , r 2 ] for PD that defines ∨, every leaf node labeled with r 1 or r 2 must have an ancestor node labeled with ⊗. We prove this observation in the next two lemmas in a more general setting. 
If φ[r 1 , . . . , r γ ] is a context for PD which uniformly defines , then in the syntax tree T φ = (T, ≺, r, f), every leaf node labeled with r i (1 ≤ i ≤ γ) has an ancestor node with a label of the form ψ ⊗ χ.
Proof. Suppose there exists a leaf node k labeled with r i which has no ancestor node with a label of the form ψ ⊗ χ. By assumption, for i, there exist PD-formulas θ 1 , . . . , θ γ satisfying (9). Let N (with |N | = n) be the set of all indices of all propositional variables occurring in the formula φ[θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ]. Take an n-team X on N such that X |= (θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ) and X |= θ i . Since φ[r 1 , . . . , r γ ] uniformly defines , we have that
. By Theorem 4.10, there is a truth function τ for φ[θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ] over X. By the property of k and Lemma 5.2, τ (k) = X. Thus X |= r i [θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ], i.e., X |= θ i , which is a contradiction.
The following elementary set-theoretic lemma will be used in the proof of Lemma 5.5.
Proof. If Y, Z X, then taking Y ′ = Y and Z ′ = Z, the lemma holds. Now, assume one of Y, Z equals X.
Case 1: Y = Z = X. Pick an arbitrary a ∈ X. Let Y ′ = X \ {a} X and Z ′ = {a}. Since |X| > 1, we have that Z ′ X. Clearly, X = (X \ {a}) ∪ {a}.
Case 2: Only one of Y and Z equals X. Without loss of generality, we assume that Y = X and Z X.
Next, we prove a crucial technical lemma for the main theorem (Theorem 5.6) of this section. (iii) For any n-element set N ⊆ N, there exist 1 ≤ j 1 < · · · < j m ≤ γ such that 2 n |= (α 1 , . . . , α γ ),
where 2 n is the maximal n-team on N , and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ γ,
Proof. Suppose was uniformly definable in PD. Then there would exist a context φ[r 1 , . . . , r γ ] for PD such that for all PD-formulas θ 1 , . . . , θ γ , φ[θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ] ≡ (θ 1 , . . . , θ γ ).
Since satisfies condition (i), by Lemma 5.3, in the syntax tree T φ = (T, <, r, f) of φ[r 1 , . . . , r γ ], each node labeled with r i (1 ≤ i ≤ γ) has an ancestor node labeled with a formula of the form ψ ⊗ χ. By condition (ii), |= (δ 1 , . . . , δ γ ) for some formulas δ 1 , . . . , δ γ , thus by (13), we have that |= φ[δ 1 , . . . , δ γ ]. By condition (iii), for the set N , there exist 1 ≤ j 1 ≤ · · · ≤ j m ≤ γ such that (11) holds. On the other hand, for each j a (1 ≤ a ≤ m), as 2 n τ (x) holds for every leaf node x labeled with r j a , we have that τ (x) |= Θ ⋆ 2 n , i.e.,
where for each α i is defined as in Equation (12). Thus, by Lemma 4.11, τ is also a truth function for φ[α 1 , . . . , α γ ] over 2 n , thereby 2 n |= φ[α 1 , . . . , α γ ]. Thus by (13), we obtain 2 n |= (α 1 , . . . , α γ ). But this contradicts (11). Now, we prove our main results of the paper as a corollary of the above theorem.
Theorem 5.7. Intuitionistic disjunction is not uniformly definable in PD.
Proof. It suffices to check that intuitionistic disjunction satisfies conditions (i)-(iii) of Theorem 5.6. Condition (i) is satisfied, since, e.g., ⊥ ∨ ⊤ |= ⊥ and ⊤ ∨ ⊥ |= ⊥. Condition (ii) is satisfied since, e.g., |= ⊤∨⊤. Lastly, for any n-element set N ⊆ N, 2 n |= Θ ⋆ 2 n ∨ Θ ⋆ 2 n , thus condition (iii) is satisfied.
We have already proved that intuitionistic implication is not uniformly definable in PD in Theorem 5.1 by observing that intuitionistic implication is not monotone. In fact, the non-uniform definability of intuitionistic implication in PD also follows from Theorem 5.6, as intuitionistic implication also satisfies conditions (i)-(iii). Indeed, we have that (i) ⊥ → ⊥ |= ⊥, (ii) |= ⊤ → ⊤ and (iii) 2 n |= ⊤ → Θ ⋆ 2 n . Finally, we summarize the results obtained in this section as a corollary concerning compositional translatability of the relevant logics based on team semantics. One may compare this corollary with Corollary 3.9.
Corollary 5.8. PID, PD ∨ ≤ PD, whereas PID, PD ∨ ≤ c PD.
Proof. By Corollary 3.4, Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.7.
Concluding remarks
As remarked in Section 2, for most familiar (single valuation-based) logics, such as classical and intuitionistic propositional logic, a fragment L 1 formed by certain connectives of the logic being translatable into another fragment L 2 is one and the same thing as L 1 being compositionally translatable into L 2 , i.e., L 1 ≤ L 2 ⇐⇒ L 1 ≤ c L 2 holds for most familiar logics. The result of this paper, as well as those in (Ciardelli, 2009) , (Galliani, 2013) show that this not the case for logics based on team semantics. Team semantics was originally devised (in the context of independence-friendly logic) by Hodges (1997a Hodges ( ), (1997b to meet one of the fundamental needs of logic and language, namely "compositionality" (see e.g. (Janssen, 1997) , (Hodges, 2001) for an overview). However, the distinctions between definability and uniform (or compositional) definability, and between translatability and compositional translatability in team semantics seem to indicate that the compositionality or uniformity in another level is lost in team semantics. In the author's opinion, this interesting new phenomenon in mathematical logic certainly calls for further investigation.
